Barometer of Security in Germany

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Currently maintaining security remains one of the key discussion topics within public, scientific and political communities, even though our democratic and pluralistic society has achieved a generally high level of security.\(^1\) The recurring discussion on security\(^2\) may seem surprising when we consider the strong advantages we have regarding our welfare and economic systems. However, a high level of security may arouse greater feelings of insecurity because of the fear of losing the achieved security in the future. The future orientated dimension of security means uncertainty and therefore an unattainable state that is devoid of risks and dangers.\(^3\)

People have their own individual ideas, to a greater or lesser extent, about what security means to them and what consequences it has on their personal life on a cognitive, emotional and behavioral level. Scientific findings on security to date, however, are limited to a selected range of aspects or selected areas. Therefore, the joint research project “Barometer of Security in Germany” (hereafter BaSiD) aimed for broader insight in the German situation of security in general as well as perceptions especially on different aspects of security. To grasp this complex and multidimensional phenomenon, the interdisciplinary partners followed diverse approaches and used a variety of research methods (representative survey, explorative study, experiment, discourse analysis etc.).

The following article will serve as an introduction to the joint research project, the theoretical background on the term security and the analysis tool, that has been designed to detect ambivalences between subjective and objective (in)security.

**The Joint Research Project BaSiD**

The study, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, monitored objective and subjective securities in Germany for three years, from 2010 until 2013. While the project primarily focused on subjective security, explicitly personal perceptions, feelings and expectations on security, these findings were complemented by objective indications on four security-relevant phenomena: natural and technical disasters, terrorism, and crime. During the research process tools of data gathering were continually developed. Primary data was collected and evaluated to generate useable results regarding security provision.

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\(^1\) Thanks to Kyra L. Cormier for proof-reading.


The research network was led by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (hereafter MPI). Partners were the Federal Criminal Police Office (hereafter BKA), Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (hereafter ISI), the Institute for Sociology of the University of Freiburg (hereafter IfS), the International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities at the University of Tübingen (hereafter IZW), the Disaster Research Unit of the Free University of Berlin (hereafter KFS), and the Communication and Media Science of the University of Düsseldorf (hereafter KMW).

BaSiD consisted of nine modules (see Figure 1): The IZW was responsible for module 1 which was concerned with developing the underlying concept of a mutual understanding of the term security. In module 2 the BKA and KFS created a database on objectively measurable harmful events, such as natural and technical disasters, terrorism, and crime. Module 3 incorporated a qualitative-quantitative study on individual perceptions of security, conducted by the IfS, as well as a representative public survey on security and quality of life by the MPI. In cooperation with the MPI the BKA implemented the first National Crime Victimization Survey within module 4. Module 5 was concerned with the question how security professionals as well as laymen seize familiar and unfamiliar spaces which was addressed by an experimental design by the KFS. Module 6 focused on new security technologies: The IfS attended to the deployment of biometric systems whereas the ISI examined participative procedures of technology engineering by means of three different workshops. In module 7 the KMW monitored the media coverage of natural and technical disasters, terrorism and crime. Accompanying research by the IZW in module 8 reflected on ethical concerns regarding the interdisciplinary cooperation during the project. Finally, module 9 provided an analysis tool to classify and assess objective and subjective security.
What is security?

Security represents an elementary basic need of human beings which comprises their thinking, emotions, and security provisions. The term refers to the absence of personal and societal risks, dangers, hazards, and threats. In spite of this negative definition, security even implies positive aspects such as quality of life and contentment, freedom from fear and worry, comfort and protection (literally: Geborgenheit), as well as trust in other people and societal institutions. However, trust cannot be completely associated with security because trust implies the possibility of being disappointed causing a feeling of insecurity.

Over the centuries, the concept of security has changed among individuals and societies. As a relative concept, security encompasses every part of our live and indeed

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5. That means the cognitive, affective, and conative (= behavioral) constituent.


drives it. That’s why our idea of security has also got an unlimited side that might be derived from its future orientation and the related uncertainty. Therefore, not only the maintenance of security is a driving force for human activities, but also its further increase. Hence, a successful rise of objective security does not correspond necessarily with the same effect concerning subjective security if the individual still feels unsafe or even more unsafe. Furthermore, new guarantees of objective security could lead to unintended side effects accompanied by subjective insecurity. In converse, an enhancement of subjective security does not mean necessarily a growth of objective security.

The already mentioned uncertain component of security means that a state without risks and dangers cannot be achieved. The resultant instability attests to a societal problem situation which raises comprehensive and wide-reaching questions. The imponderability of the future and its inherent dynamic can only result in structural stability for a specific reference object and a limited time frame. The related contingency of security partially explains the security paradox that can generate both more security and more insecurity. As a result, security represents a complex, emotional, and normatively charged construct whose content and contours are unclear because all areas of human life are affected. These considerations show that security has advanced to become a multi-faceted societal central theme in the last decades.

In the BaSiD project security is understood as a social construction in accordance with numerous theoretical works. Looking at the objective situation, security and insecurity are a bundle of different risks and hazards such as catastrophes and terrorism as low probability, high impact incidents, and crime as a ubiquitous phenomenon. The

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15 Cf. e.g. Giebel (2012), p. 25 ff.
mere countability suggests objectivity that is relative from a constructivist perspective. One example is crime statistics because they cover only those offences known to the police but not those that remain unreported. According to the four considered, objective threats the project defines security in a negative sense meaning the absence of insecurity. The negative definition is also based on the operationalization of security in the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Negatively connected damaging incidents might be expressed in objective risks, dangers, hazards, and threats as well as in subjective anxieties, fears, concerns, and worries. Positive aspects like trust, wellbeing, and life quality serve as explaining factors of feelings of security in the representative study of the MPI on ‘Security and Quality of Life in Germany’.

The security quadrate

In order to grasp objective and subjective securities, two essential questions were consistently pursued: How secure is Germany? And how secure do people feel in Germany? These questions indicate that objective security is measurable by its statistical probability, whereas subjective security is connected with emotions. These different focal points hint at the ambivalence of objective and subjective security: as a consequence, ‘being secure’ and ‘feeling secure’ may coincide but also fall apart. Essential insights into the relationship of objective and subjective security can be derived from the Thomas theorem: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. According to this, people’s behavior is based on assessing a situation, but not on the objective circumstances. In order to reflect this ambivalence, the security quadrate (see Figure 2) was developed and shows the partial inconsistency and respective discrepancy of objective and subjective security.

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18 Merton, Robert K. (1968): Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press, p. 477, was inspired by the Thomas theorem and developed the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
The security quadrate is a four-field matrix which consists of four quadrants “secure, putative secure, putative insecure, and insecure”. Objective security belongs to the vertical on the left side “secure” and on the right side “insecure”. In the horizontal subjective security is situated on the upper row “secure” and the lower row “insecure”. The crosstab table enables to map (in)securities as follows: whereas the actual situation and their assessment correspond with each other in the quadrants “secure” and “insecure”, they fall apart within the quadrants “putative secure” and “putative insecure”. One famous example for such a gap between “insecure” and “putative secure” might be the heat wave in 2003. Although the heat wave caused ca. 9,355 deaths in total and is regarded as the worst catastrophe of this century in Germany, the hot and stable summer seems to be remembered as a pleasant exception by a lot of people. In view of the threat potential of a heat wave, the perceived security is deceptive.

**Personal and societal security**

The attribution within the security quadrate needs another differentiation between personal and societal security. Societal security concerns general matters with diverse facets on the macro level. One example is economy divided into, inter alia, econo-

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nic and employment situation as well as consumer behavior. Due to their complexity and lack of experience, status descriptions, problem analysis, and further trends in development are largely thus beyond the individual perception and are dependent upon media reporting. The ephemeral nature of news and the accumulation of daily events make it necessary to focus and to prioritize. This practice hampers an objective reporting by overlooking, neglecting or overstating (in)securities.

In contrast, personal security characterizes one’s own horizon of experience under which the person expresses personal views on various (in)securities in his or her own life. Feeling safe is based on a process in which personal estimations are developed by experiences. As a result, personal security seems to be an individual attribution and construction taking into account differences in personality and attitudes of human beings. Hence, congruencies between people and groups can be observed that mainly relate to the estimation of (in)secure places and persons by means of objective criteria (e.g., crime rates), effects of sex and age, and also the assessment of interrelations between individuals and the environment. To conclude, the separation of personal and societal securities had consequences in the quantitative-qualitative study of the IfS as well as the representative citizen survey of the MPI: each person surveyed estimated the potential of societal worries for him or her depending on their personal involvement. In the following section some findings of the MPI study will be introduced.  

Security in relation to personal and societal worries

Natural catastrophes, industrial accidents, and terrorist attacks are quite rare damaging incidents in Germany. Each year, these phenomena are usually recorded in the single digits. In 2013 the EM database only recorded four natural catastrophes and no industrial accidents. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) recorded one act of terrorism. Both open-source databases have their deficiencies. The data on damaging incidents and their extent is incomplete and fragmented, causing the registered objectivity to be relative and amplified by the differentiating definitions, objectives, and collection systems. Nonetheless, reference points can be drawn from these small numbers for objective security in the three mentioned phenomena. The noteworthy


The GTD is also an open-source database by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland in the USA: www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.


Though crime are the most important phenomenon, crime will not be considered in detail because of its relevance for the living environment and its complexity.
low case numbers of catastrophes, industrial accidents, and terrorist attacks arrive at the cautious conclusion, that in this regard Germany is a secure country.

Considering the already introduced security quadrate an attribution in this sense is only possible on the basis of the surveyed data about subjective security sensitivities and perceptions (MPI-Survey ‘Security and Quality of Life in Germany’). Therefore, Figure 3 displays societal worries of the German population. The societal worries are ranked after the personal relevance of different areas of security.28

Figure 3: Societal worries among the German population

Data Source: MPI-Survey ‘Security and Quality of Life in Germany’ (2012), N=2.525

Regarding the mentioned phenomena, respondents have the least worries concerning natural disasters (18%) and terrorist attacks (29%) compared to the other themes in a social regard. Different from these two damaging incidents, nearly half of the respondents are worried about the development of crime in Germany.

According to the survey, crime is the third most important social sorrow concerning the questioned issues. But the total recorded offences are close to six million like the years before with a 6% decrease from the previous year. Except for 2011 police reported that the crime rate has actually diminished for every year since 2005. With regard to crime, objective and subjective security seems to fall apart for almost half of the people assessed in the security quadrate. In a societal regard, objective security exits, but also subjective insecurity among a relevant part of the population (‘putative insecure’). Nevertheless, a valid and reliable answer to this divergence cannot be given at this point. First of all, the reference points of crime according to the security

28 Thanks to Dr. Dina Hummelsheim for the figures.
quadrate have to be explained, as also does the question concerning the criteria for the existence of objective security.

In contrast to Figure 3, Figure 4 shows personal worries of the Germany population again ranked after the personal relevance of different areas of security.

Figure 4: Personal worries among the German population

![Bar chart showing personal worries among the German population](image)

Data Source: MPI-Survey 'Security and Quality of Life in Germany' (2012), N=2.525

Pursuant to first analysis, the respondents reported considerably less personal worries in comparison to societal worries: The majority of respondents is not worried about personal security areas. Despite worries about being dependent on care in old age (41%), the two major personal fears, insufficient provision for old age and becoming seriously ill, only bother more than one third (37%) and more than one quarter (28%). In contrast, societal worries range from 38% to 73% in eight out of ten areas of societal security. Accordingly, societal worries on terrorist attacks are on the same level as the second highest personal worry with both 28%.

On a personal level, only one-tenth of the respondents are worried about being a victim of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. Rather fewer people (14%) are afraid about becoming a crime victim. Personal worries about becoming a crime victim are much lower than societal worries about the growth of crime in Germany (48%). In a personal regard, major worries are concerned with areas of life like care in old age, health, or the loss of a loved one.

Referring to the security quadrate, in the personal environment the data on objective security and the present database on subjective estimations of security agree with each other concerning natural disasters and terrorist attacks and thus mean ‘secure’ in both cases, likewise according to societal society albeit alleviated.
The statements of the respondents are, however, generally expressed societal and personal worries on diverse phenomena. Particularly, the term ‘natural disasters’ embraces a whole range of diverse catastrophes like the aforementioned heat wave. Also, one has to bear in mind that the attitudes are not consistent over time, but depend on the actual damaging incidents. For example, in 2013, one year after the citizen survey, another centennial flood\textsuperscript{29}, that caused the highest economic damage costs\textsuperscript{30} during the last 25 years, took place in Germany. Shortly after this incident, respondents would probably have expressed more worries concerning natural catastrophes.

**Conclusion**

The so called barometer of security is a flexible and progressing instrument for analyzing objective and subjective securities. The result of the joint project is a prototype consisting of subjective and objective data from different sources and based on diverse methodological approaches (analysis of statistics, [non] representative surveys, qualitative as well as quantitative data).\textsuperscript{31}

The introduced security quadrate is an attempt to connect theoretical and practical concepts of security. The general descriptive and typological scheme enables a basic classification of individual positions and perceptions. Starting from the two basic and opposed views on security, i.e. the subjective one and the objective one, both perceptions are systematically contrasted with each other, resulting in a simple, yet fundamental typology which allows one to expound the problems of their respective agreements and disagreements. Through this schematization, the analytical view specifies fields of insecurities that are addressed by the two quadrants ‘putative secure’ and ‘putative insecure’ (see Figure 2). An analysis in detail may reveal differences within one phenomenon concerning the feeling of security on a societal and personal level. Consequently, an elaborated assessment would consist of multiple security quadrates according to each phenomenon’s ramifications and to the typology of individuals. Such an assessment even supports the identification of the (in)securities of different persons and groups on an individual and societal level.

In practice, the security quadrate could be used as an assessment tool for crime prevention to identify ambivalences in objective and subjective (in)securities among diverse types of residents. However, the limits of the security quadrate should be recognized: The scheme only allows for the classification of diverging (in)security perceptions and interests, but not for solutions to maintain and provide security in communities.

\textsuperscript{29} The first centennial flood occurred in 2002: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile.

\textsuperscript{30} http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile.

\textsuperscript{31} See Haverkamp 2014a.
Klaus M. Beier

The German Dunkelfeld Project: Proactive Strategies to Prevent Child Sexual Abuse and the Use of Child Abusive Images

Background

Official statistics account for only a fraction of all child sexual abuse (CSA) and the use of child abusive images (so called ‘child pornography offenses’ – CPO). Those cases not reported to the authorities constitute a large part of sexual offenses against children and are in German referred to as ‘Dunkelfeld’ (literally ‘dark field’). Consequently, preventive efforts must consider both primary prevention in the case of potential offenders as well as secondary prevention for self-referred offenders in the Dunkelfeld.

How to reach whom?

Two groups of those sexually offending against children can be distinguished:

- Those showing no sexual preference disorder, but who, for different reasons, sexually abuse children seeking a surrogate. This group comprises e.g. sexually inexperienced adolescents, mentally retarded persons, those with anti-social personality disorders and perpetrators within general traumatizing family constellations – and accounts for approximately 60% of officially known offenders;

- Those showing a sexual preference disorder, namely pedophilia (erotic preference for prepubescent minors, i.e. showing Tanner stage 1) or hebephilia (erotic preference for pubescent minors, i.e. showing Tanner stages 2 and 3). These account for approximately 40% of officially known offenders.

Sexual preference, in general, manifests itself during adolescence and remains unchanged thereafter. This is true for pedophilia and hebephilia, as well. Thus, pedophiles and hebephiles will always be at risk of offending and/or re-offending, mainly in the Dunkelfeld. Furthermore, empiric data suggests that pedophiles and hebephiles reveal high levels of co-morbidity and distress because of the problems associated with their sexual preference and that, as a result, they are more likely than other sexual offenders to seek treatment. However, community-based specialised diagnostic and therapeutic programs for these self-referred individuals remain scarce.

For that reason, at the Institute of Sexology and Sexual Medicine in Berlin, a prevention approach was developed by generating a media campaign to encourage self-identified (but officially not registered) pedophiles and hebephiles to seek professional help to avoid committing CSA and CPO.
Project Procedure

The ongoing Prevention Project Dunkelfeld (PPD) was officially launched in 2005 with an extensive media campaign which publicised the opportunity to get help. The media campaign was designed to communicate the following messages:

1. Empathy for the particular situation of the participants;
2. No discrimination because of sexual preference;
3. Confidentiality and anonymity regarding all collected data; and
4. No augmentation of feelings of guilt and shame.

The following slogan was chosen: ‘You are not guilty because of your sexual desire, but you are responsible for your sexual behavior. There is help! Don’t become an offender!’ The campaign’s poster was placed in print media and on city billboards, and a TV-spot was broadcasted on several German TV channels and in cinemas.

The translated headline of the poster was ‘Do you like children in ways you shouldn’t?’

In 2009 the media campaign was extended to include potential and undetected child pornography offenders. The message was: ‘Child pornography is sexual abuse. You are not to blame for your sexual responsiveness to child pornography, but you are responsible for your own behavior. It is your choice whether you click on it or not. Help is available! Don’t become an offender. Not even online!’

Since July 2012, with the help of Google adwords, potential consumers of child abusive images are guided to the therapeutic offer of the PPD by common search keywords. Respondents to the media campaign can contact the research team anonymously (e.g. by telephone), and the staff are specifically trained to build a trustworthy and empathetic relationship during the initial contact. A personal identification number (PIN) is assigned to each respondent who:

1. self-identifies as a pedophile and/or hebephile;
2. expresses interest in the content of the project because of distress related to his sexual preference; and/or
3. expresses an interest in consulting a clinical expert.

Those respondents interested and able to attend a consultation are questioned about their criminal and sexual history as well as their sexual fantasies and behaviours. In addition, socio-demographic data (age, education, employment, family status, number of children), former experiences with health professionals, and the interviewees’ handling of information regarding their sexual preference are assessed.
Outcomes

From the beginning of the project in 2005, on average, 15–20 individuals per month contacted the research office in Berlin, so that, as of March 2014, there have been 1959 applications, 845 assessments and treatment offers to 412 individuals.

The decrease from applications to treatment offers is mainly due to geographical distances – the applicants came from all over Germany. As expected, the vast majority were either pedophiles or hebephiles. Half of them had already committed child sexual abuse and three quarters admitted to child pornography offenses in the Dunkelfeld.

In a specialized one-year treatment program the participants learn to ensure impulse control by using cognitive-behavioural techniques, sexological tools (integrating the attachment dimension in terms of an increase of social functioning), as well as pharmaceutical options (mostly androgen deprivation therapy). The evaluation of the PPD was done in a non-randomized waiting list–control design with multiple assessments for 75 participants. It revealed that the primary prevention approach:

▪ reduces risk factors for child sexual abuse;
▪ prevents sexual offending against minors and reduces the number of contact offenses;
▪ reduces the frequency and severity of child pornography offences.

Conclusions

First results of the Berlin Prevention Project Dunkelfeld can be summarized as follows:

1. A significant number of pedophiles and hebephiles in the community are not known to the justice system and have no contact with preventive services. These pedophilic and hebephilic men are either potential offenders or real offenders. However, they remain undetected in the Dunkelfeld;
2. Many pedophiles and hebephiles who are not known to the authorities would be willing to participate in a treatment program aiming to prevent child sexual abuse and the use of child abusive images, provided they know how to access it and feel they can trust the pledge of confidentiality by experts specialized in assessment and therapy of their disorder;
3. A specially designed media campaign is able to communicate these goals;
4. The success of this preventive program is based on German legislation regarding the reporting of CSA and CPO; according to German law, it is considered a breach of confidentiality for the treating therapist to report either committed or planned CSA or CPO;
5. The current situation in other countries – even those with mandatory report laws – would allow at least a focus on potential or real users of child abusive images in the Dunkelfeld for preventive purposes. It is a fact that the use of child abu-
sive images is an indicator for a pedophilic inclination and therefore every user is an important target for prevention. The PPD has proved that it is possible to reach pedophiles and hebephiles in the community and to encourage these men to change their habit of consuming child abusive images. Furthermore it indicates the likelihood of preventing crossover to child sexual abuse – which is a promising primary prevention approach for this cause. But, of course, this will only work if trust is achieved and confidentiality guaranteed.

**Prevention Network “Kein Täter werden” (Don’t offend)**

By now, the Prevention Project Dunkelfeld (PPD) is established in 9 further German states. These contact points constitute the Prevention Network ‘Kein Täter werden’ (literally ‘don’t become an offender’) which is coordinated at the Berlin Institute of Sexology and Sexual Medicine. Next to the one in Berlin, there are outpatient clinics of the project in Kiel (since 2009), Regensburg (2010), Leipzig (2011), Hannover (2012), Hamburg (2012), Stralsund (2013), Giessen (2013), Düsseldorf (2014) and Ulm (2014). The therapeutic services offered by these contact points are, as expected, in fact called on by affected persons. Until summer 2014, far more than 4,000 people seeking help reached out to the Prevention Network ‘Kein Täter werden’. There are more contact points of the project being planned. Expanding the Prevention Network to establish nationwide primary prevention in order to avoid sexual traumatization of children and adolescents is the target. This primary prevention is recommended by the final report of the ‘Runder Tisch Sexueller Kindesmissbrauch’ (Round Table for Sexual Abuse), a committee installed by the German government to prevent child sexual abuse, consisting of politicians and representatives from science and relevant social groups. The experience of the Prevention Network shows that attitudes supporting abusive behavior can be reduced significantly by therapeutic means and medication support. This makes originator-related prevention of sexual assaults work.
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