

EvIs

Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Islamism



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Preliminary remarks

This publication is a translated version of the German original. We have slightly adapted certain terms and phrases to match the commonly used English expressions. This mainly refers to the quotations from the focus groups and some specialist terms (e.g. ISIL instead of IS).

Apart from that, we made no significant changes to the content of this manual or the indicators. While we do welcome international readers to use and apply EVIs in their work, we want to stress that it was developed in and for the specific context of Germany. Therefore, when applying EVIs in another country, users should carefully consider which alterations they might need to make.

Preface to the English edition

The prevention, prediction and countering of Islamist extremism are still a work in progress. Over the past decade, practitioners of various fields (such as social work, youth work, and education) have faced challenges posed by the emerging phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation to which few professional and academic insights were available at that time. Especially the attacks on European soil committed by foreign and returning terrorist fighters from the alleged Caliphate in Syria and Iraq put enormous political pressure and expectations on frontline workers in the field of prevention. However, they could do little more than build their response on whatever experience with similar groups was available and were consequently forced to operate on a trial and error basis.

Today the situation is different. Throughout Europe, initiatives that work in a more structured, evidence-based, and transparent way are under development, responding to the needs of policy-makers, the general public, researchers, and practitioners alike. This manual (EvlS) fits into this development. Commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community and based on insights from practitioners and existing literature, researchers have worked on a set of indicators of individual processes associated with radicalisation.

A set of indicators does not exempt the user from the obligation to reflect critically on how each indicator relates to each individual case. Nor does it mean that factors not included in the list should be ignored. It rather is an aid for professional judgement, case management and assessment.

The EvlS indicators do not exclusively point to attitudes and action associated with Islamist radicalisation. Some characteristics, such as "problematic use of substances" or a "propensity for violence", may indicate a need for treatment by additional professionals. For this reason, it is useful when organisations working on secondary and tertiary prevention are embedded in a broader network to hand over these cases to other practitioners.

Some indicators concerning religion and ideology pose another challenge: where is the tipping point at which religious or ideological commitment becomes a matter of radicalisation and, thus, prevention? Here, EvlS explicitly does not provide any specific cut-off points or, indeed, an assessment of the degree of radicalisation as such. It is the full picture for each individual case that matters and may give insight into how relevant a certain indicator is for this person's (de-)radicalisation process. In order to assess such a complex phenomenon, sufficient knowledge on Islam as a world religion as well as contacts to experts, who are able to contextualise behaviour, is of utmost importance.

With EvlS, professionals can monitor how their clients' orientation towards Islamism develops over a sustained period of time. This also allows professionals to reflect on the efficacy of their own work. Internal evaluations can be a meaningful approach to improve the quality of programmes. However, they do not replace an external evaluation. When using EvlS as an evaluation tool, it is important to create a safe environment in which professionals can openly admit that parts of their work offer room for improvement.

EvlS has been developed within the context of Germany. Although Islamism is a global phenomenon, its local occurrences and contextual factors differ, as do the indicators

associated with processes of radicalisation. Discrimination may not play as big a role in Muslim majority countries, whereas (perception of) deprivation may be a universal factor. Therefore, it is important to adapt the tool to the specific context in which it is applied.

Providing an inventory with 38 indicators will inevitably spark the debate, whether they represent every relevant aspect (or too much) of the complex issue "Islamism". The authors of EvIs describe in detail how they came to include these particular indicators within the inventory and make clear where the limits for its application lie. As such, it is a user-friendly, and openly accessible tool for evaluation of CVE practises in Germany and abroad.

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PART I: BACKGROUND

1. Introduction and political context

In the past four years, the German Federal Government has launched two comprehensive frameworks for preventing (Islamist) extremism: the Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and the Promotion of Democracy (*Strategie zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung*, July 2016) and the National Prevention Programme against Islamist Extremism (*NPP*, April 2017). These two programmes point out that the prevention of extremism in all forms and manifestations will remain an ongoing task for civil society, security agencies and research institutions.

The German Federal Government's strategy, therefore, stipulates critical and continuous evaluation to provide a solid knowledge base for further developing measures and structures for the prevention of extremism. However, it remains vague with respect to the criteria, means and methods of evaluation. Hence, it is an ongoing challenge "to establish an accompanying evaluation culture that unites commitment, certain scientific standards, transparency and also a culture of error" (El-Mafaalani et al. 2016: 27¹) in the emerging field of preventing Islamist radicalisation.

Mandate

In August 2016, the German Federal Minister of the Interior at the time, Dr. Thomas de Maizière, announced the establishment "[...] of a focus area on impact evaluation, primarily regarding the prevention of Islamist radicalisation" (BMI 2016: 9) to be located at the National Centre for Crime Prevention (NZK). The ministry subsequently invited the NZK to develop

initial ideas for evidence-based prevention of Islamist radicalisation, which should gradually lead to more concretely defined prevention objectives and improved quality standards. Since then, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI) has funded the project "Development of Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Extremism (EEE)" at the NZK from 2017-2019.

Given this sensitive mission, the project team exposed themselves to a wide range of competing interests: Policy-makers, practitioners, and academics project their individual claims, some of which are difficult to reconcile, into the "expectation triangle of evaluation" (Walkenhorst 2019). In particular, the political call for impact evaluations was met with considerable resistance and scepticism. Thus, in order to meet all demands in the best possible way, an elaborate consultation process accompanied the project throughout all phases. In addition to the relevant departments within the BMI, this process involved representatives of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ), the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The joint meetings were important for coordinating the approach, but also revealed that the project could not meet the expectations of all stakeholders to an equal degree.

Procedure

Throughout the project, the team further met with relevant experts from the so-called Radicalisation Competence Centres and coordinators of the federal states, relevant associations as well as with practitioners from various prevention projects. In summer 2017, the NZK hosted an international conference in Hanover with the title "Building an evidence-base for the

Evaluation is subject to conflicting interests.

1 | All translations of direct quotes are by the authors/translators.

prevention of radicalization and violent extremism".² Its objectives were to debate the virtues of "evidence-based practices" in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism and to discuss the right balance between necessary pragmatism and scientific rigour in the evaluation of preventive interventions.

This handbook with the title "Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Islamism – EvIs" is the result of this long consultation process. It consists of 38 indicators that may indicate a person's growing orientation towards Islamist extremism. These indicators have been derived from the practical experience of various (professional) groups in the field of preventing Islamist extremism. EvIs thus includes different notions about what indicates Islamist radicalisation (and de-radicalisation) and thereby serves as a flexible tool for evaluating different approaches with varying prevention objectives for diverse target groups. We want to emphasise that the criteria presented here do not represent targets for prevention work or performance indicators. Rather, they are characteristics which practitioners from different areas of expertise consider relevant for processes of Islamist radicalisation. These characteristics may change (in the desired direction) as a result of a preventive intervention. However, there is no universal yardstick to measure how many indicators have to change and to what extent before one can consider a client to be sufficiently de-radicalised from or resilient to Islamist extremism.

The criteria presented in this manual do not represent targets for prevention work.

Objective

With EvIs, we want to direct the research interest of evaluations towards processes of change. They are key to prevention work of all types. The aim of prevention work is to prevent undesirable developments or to support favourable ones. Through systematic observation of how people change during an intervention, monitoring and evaluation can also examine questions of impact.

The first part of this handbook begins by briefly introducing the topic of evaluation in order to situate EvIs within this context (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, we describe the rationale and scope of EvIs and explain for which purposes it can (and cannot) be used. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the methodology used in the development of EvIs. Chapters 5 and 6 respectively describe protective factors and societal context factors. The second part of the handbook contains the tool itself, namely a description of its structure and application as well as the 38 indicators.

2 | <https://www.nzkrim.de/veranstaltungen/evidence-base-for-cve>

2. Evaluation: Limitations and possibilities

An evaluation is an assessment of professional action based on scientific methods. In principle, it can examine any aspect of this action (e.g. the concept, the processes or the results of a preventive intervention) and it can be carried out by an external evaluator or by the project staff themselves.

Expectations and realities

Many practitioners are ambivalent about evaluation. On the one hand, they have a sincere interest in an appropriate reflection of their professional actions. On the other hand, many are particularly critical of external (impact) evaluations, as they are often associated with success monitoring, accountability, additional work and a lack of practical relevance. Their understandable concern is that a negative assessment, carried out according to standards that may not do justice to the nature of the work, could lead to a cessation of funding.

Politicians and the public often expect evaluations to provide quick and unambiguous answers regarding the effectiveness of preventive interventions ("What works?"). These questions, however, concern a very heterogeneous field of work and a very complex problem (radicalisation and extremism) to which there usually is no simple solution. Therefore, if evaluations of preventive interventions are to be suitable for their object of enquiry and generate meaningful results, they must employ multifaceted and flexible approaches (see Armborst et al. 2019: 1-2). Nevertheless, hardly any evaluation is likely to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders equally. Policy-makers, administrations, practitioners, clients, the public, and researchers put very different expectations on both the intervention and its

The expectation of quick and unambiguous answers stands in contrast to a very heterogeneous prevention landscape.

evaluation. This makes it even more important for the commissioning party to make sure all stakeholders agree on the concrete research objectives of an evaluation study in order to avoid false expectations.

Which data?

The results of evaluations can be subject to even more controversy. The publication of important evaluations is often followed by discussions about their "correct" interpretation. Therefore, it is crucial that results are based on reliable data, and are "inter-subjectively verifiable".

The requirements for such data are high: they must adequately reflect the object of prevention, comply with ethical research standards and data protection regulations, be accessible and at the same time meet the highest possible scientific requirements. A broad range of research methods is available for collecting and analysing such data (see, e.g., Döring/Bortz 2016).

EvIs adds to existing tools of data collection with an inventory of indicators that can accompany processes of (de-)radicalisation. An indicator is an observable sign of a characteristic that is otherwise not immediately recognisable. Islamist radicalisation is a social attribution with many possible signs. For example, a person's regular contact with a radical group (see indicator "Contacts to a radicalised social environment") may be a manifest sign of radicalisation. If the target group of a preventive intervention does not make contact with radical peers or breaks off existing ties, this may indicate – under certain circumstances – that prevention mechanisms are working.

By comparing the development of several indicators from EvIs over time, one can observe individual developments in the context of the preventive intervention. We also hope that this will enable a certain degree of comparability between different approaches to prevention – not to create competition, but to support mutual learning.

Indicators increase the comparability of different approaches, thus enabling mutual learning.

This handbook is a tool for structured data collection: it explains how to identify and document potential characteristics of Islamist radicalisation for the purpose of evaluation. This is, of course, but one of many steps in the evaluation process. For an evaluation to be comprehensive and suitable for its object, one should always collect further qualitative and quantitative data using appropriate methods, for example, in order to analyse processes and contexts. Especially when the focus of the evaluation is on impact and effectiveness, we recommend integrating information gathered on the effects, outcomes, processes, and contexts of the evaluated intervention, taking into account their interdependencies. Ideally, the evaluation can then explain under which conditions and for which target groups the mechanisms of an intervention work in what way.

Planning and cooperation

For an evaluation to be feasible and meaningful, project managers should anticipate its demands as soon as they start to design the prevention project itself. A clear formulation of the (sometimes implicit) objectives of the preventive intervention, its rationale of action, and assumptions about its impact mechanisms helps to focus an evaluation on the essential interests from the outset. Proper planning helps to anticipate practical obstacles that may arise during the research process.

It is also important to acknowledge the limits of an evaluation. As with science in general, not everything that one would like to know can actually be determined by conducting evaluations. The available data reflect only a part of the reality and, therefore, limit the horizon of knowledge. Since data collection can be very costly and time-consuming, it is crucial to find the right balance between effort and benefit. Project documentation and case records can be an important source of information, especially if evaluation requirements have been taken into account in advance. Project data that has been documented in a structured and purposeful way may already constitute a sufficient basis for evaluation. All this requires close cooperation between evaluators and project managers from the outset. Therefore, a participatory approach is vital.

The Beccaria-Standards for ensuring quality in crime prevention projects provide helpful guidance on how to integrate evaluation into project planning.³ In combination with the indicators presented in this handbook, they can also be applied in the prevention of Islamist radicalisation.

3 | <https://www.beccaria-standards.net/Media/Beccaria-Standards-englisch.pdf>

3. Rationale and scope of EvIs

Measures to prevent Islamist radicalisation range from civic education and projects aimed at strengthening democracy (primary-universal prevention) to targeted support of demobilisation, disengagement and de-radicalisation (tertiary-indicated prevention).⁴ Different occupational groups (such as security agencies, educators, and psychologists) work in each of these areas, using different approaches.⁵ Their common point of reference are processes of Islamist radicalisation and de-radicalisation (here also referred to as processes of turning towards or away from Islamist extremism).

Rationale

While primary-universal prevention aims to prevent the development of such processes from the outset, secondary-selective and tertiary-indicated approaches target manifest expressions of radicalisation with the aim of reversing them or inhibiting their further development. This is where EvIs becomes important. With the help of this tool, it is possible to trace how certain signs of processes of turning towards Islamist extremism change individually over time in participants of a preventive intervention.

We deliberately avoid adopting a uniform definition of the term "Islamist radicalisation", because neither practitioners nor academics unanimously agree on this.⁶ Instead, we have decided to conduct our own research in order to achieve an

4 | On the limits of the concept of prevention, see Heinz (2004: 16); Schmetz (1999) and Greuel (2018).

5 | For an inventory, see Gruber/Lützingler/Kemmesies (2016: 28) and Trautmann/Zick (2016).

6 | We are aware of the definitional problems of the term Islamism (Salafism, Neosalafism, Fundamentalism, etc.). For pragmatic reasons, in this handbook, we use the term Islamism, following Tilman Seidensticker, as "efforts to transform society, culture, the state or politics on the basis of values and norms that are seen as Islamic" (Seidensticker 2014: 9).

EvIs captures changes in characteristics of radicalisation within the context of an intervention.

An understanding of radicalisation that is practically oriented and adequate to German society

understanding of radicalisation that is application-oriented as well as adequate to German society (see also Chapter 4). Generally, we understand processes of turning towards Islamist extremism as the result of an interaction between social influences and individual development. EvIs is designed to reflect the individual dimension of such processes.

We do not claim to provide a theoretical explanation for radicalisation. EvIs does not differentiate between causes and symptoms of Islamist radicalisation. This distinguishes it from risk assessment tools such as RADAR-iTE⁷, TRAP-18⁸ or VERA-2R⁹. EvIs is not a tool to classify a person as more or less radical. Rather, it works based on the assumption that individuals who participate in a project of secondary-selective or tertiary-indicated prevention or de-radicalisation are considered to be radicalised to some extent or at risk of turning towards Islamist extremism by the responsible actors (project staff, security agencies etc.). Given this context, you can use EvIs to assess individual changes in the signs that characterise this process of turning towards Islamist extremism.

Scope

The handbook can be applied to a broad range of prevention approaches. Nevertheless, its application is inevitably limited to interventions, which directly involve radicalised individuals or those at risk of radicalisation over a sustained period of time. Other approaches, such as networking initiatives, trainings of trainers, dissemination of information or one-time counselling, require different evaluation criteria not included in this handbook. Furthermore, EvIs does not exhaustively cover the objectives of projects with a very large

7 | *Regelbasierte Analyse potentiell destruktiver Täter zur Einschätzung des akuten Risikos islamistischer Terrorismus – Rule-based analysis of potentially destructive offenders for assessing the acute risk of Islamist terrorism (a tool used by German security agencies)*

8 | *Terrorism Radicalization Assessment Protocol*

9 | *Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 Revised*

and diverse target group, operating in a pre-emptive manner before any radicalisation begins (i.e. primary-universal prevention, such as projects for promoting democracy).

The primary purpose of EvIs is, therefore, to evaluate interventions in secondary-selective and tertiary-indicated prevention. In principle, it can also serve as a basis for evaluations in the primary-universal field. In this case, however, evaluators should extend and adapt the tool to the concrete objectives of the project.

Within these limitations, EvIs can be applied to assess individual developmental processes in the context of a preventive intervention. Despite its standardisation, the tool adapts flexibly to different projects and individual cases:

- ▶ From a pool of 38 indicators, one can select those which best reflect the practical approaches and objectives of the prevention project (see Part II, Chapter 1.1 "Modular system").
- ▶ Furthermore, within this selection, it is possible to determine how relevant each indicator is for each individual (see Part II, Chapter 1.4. "Rating of relevance").

This approach facilitates (1) suitable evaluations for different prevention approaches and (2) the documentation of individual case profiles within an intervention. For example, within the same intervention, one client's relationship with his father (see indicator "Difficult family circumstances/relations") may be key to his problematic development. For another client, this indicator is unimportant – instead, a combination of other factors seems crucial for her growing orientation towards Islamist extremism, such as a critical life event (see the category "Coping with critical life events") and contact to a Salafi peer group (see indicator "Contacts to a radicalised social environment").

Especially for the purpose of impact evaluation, it is useful to observe how case-specific indicators of radicalisation change over time.

Effect or impact?

As mentioned above, this tool serves to document changes in indicators that may be related to Islamist radicalisation. As such, the outcomes (effects) achieved by preventive interventions are of particular interest. Whether a causal relationship between the intervention and changes in the participants can be determined, depends mainly on the evaluation design. Different paradigms co-exist in this field, which Dollinger (2018) summarises as evidence-based research, realistic evaluation, and performative research on consequences. In addition, applied research has demonstrated the logic model to be a suitable method for mapping assumptions about impact (see, e.g., Beywl et al. 2007 and Yngborn/Hoops 2018).

4. Developing the instrument

The 38 indicators are the result of several focus groups (FG) and expert interviews (EI). Focus groups are moderated group discussions in which selected participants discuss specific key questions (see below). When focus groups were not possible for organisational or other reasons, we discussed the same key questions in individual interviews with experts. Our goal was to achieve an application-oriented understanding of radicalisation that adequately reflects the discourse in German society. We assumed that there is a heterogeneous pool of knowledge on radicalisation, which is characterised on the one hand by universal knowledge within society as a whole and on the other hand by context-specific expertise from various professional fields. The focus groups and expert interviews thus served to capture this knowledge and the diverse perspectives from relevant occupational and societal groups on various aspects of Islamist radicalisation as authentically as possible. We also hoped that such a participatory approach would increase the acceptance and benefit of the evaluation criteria among actors in the field of extremism prevention.

Practical knowledge about radicalisation forms the basis of the indicators.

4.1 Data collection

We conducted a total of eleven focus groups and expert interviews with 45 participants. The selection criterion for participation in the focus groups/expert interviews was relevant professional experience in dealing with (possibly) radicalised people. In addition, we conducted a focus group with young Muslims to capture the experiences of a societal group that is at the centre of the discourse on radicalisation. In total, we covered the following areas:

1. Employees from primary-universal and secondary-selective prevention (FG/EI Prevention)
2. Male and female Muslim adolescents aged 16 to 21 (FG Muslim Adolescents)
3. Imams (FG Imams; EI Imam)
4. Prison staff (e.g. criminological service, general prison staff) (FG Prisons)
5. Employees of security agencies (e.g. Federal Office and State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, Federal Criminal Police Office and State Criminal Police Offices) (FG Security Agencies)
6. Employees in refugee shelters (e.g. initial registration centres, municipal shelters) (FG Refugee Shelters)
7. Psychiatric/psychological experts (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

The focus groups and expert interviews were semi-structured. The underlying guide included the following questions:

- ▶ What do you see as indicators or early warning signs of Islamist radicalisation?
- ▶ Which factors can protect against radicalisation or promote resilience?
- ▶ What would you identify as risk factors for radicalisation?
- ▶ Are there gender-specific factors/indications of radicalisation?

The group discussions lasted between two and two-and-a-half hours. Participants were asked to discuss both attitudes and specific behaviours and to give examples from their (professional) everyday life. The imams as well as the participants in the focus groups with prison staff and security agencies were all male; in the group of young Muslims the gender ratio was nearly balanced (three female and four male participants). In all other focus groups and expert interviews, male participants outweighed female participants. Overall, 80% of the 45 participants were male.

4.2 Data analysis

Method

The focus group discussions and interviews were recorded using a voice recorder and then transcribed. On this basis, we performed a qualitative content analysis of the discussions and interviews using MAXQDA. The topics set out in the interview guideline (e.g. the distinction between protective and risk factors) served as predefined categories (deductive category assignment). We then determined their concrete manifestations (e.g. experience of discrimination) inductively, i.e. we derived the number and designation of these lower categories from the interview material itself (see Figures 1 and 2).¹⁰ Going through several coding rounds, we iteratively adapted the coding scheme until it remained stable.¹¹

Outcome

The content analysis of the transcripts resulted in 88 (dynamic) indicators for processes of turning toward Islamist extremism, 12 protective factors, 16 static risk factors and 15 societal (context) factors. In an iterative process, we then successively reduced and summarised these indicators and factors (see below).

10 | On inductive and deductive category development, see Mayring (2000); Fereday/Muir-Cochrane (2006).

11 | We determined saturation inductively (cf. Saunders et al. 2018), i.e. as soon as no new categories emerged from the material.

Figure 1:
Category scheme of dynamic indicators





Figure 2:
Category scheme of protective and contextual factors



4.3 Selection of indicators

In a multi-stage selection process (see Figure 3), we reduced the total number of 131 criteria to a more manageable catalogue containing only the most relevant indicators. 38 indicators were included in the final version of the instrument.

We initially focused on the 88 dynamic indicators for processes of turning towards Islamism, as these alterable characteristics are most relevant for evaluation.

Generalisability and general relevance

In a first step, we examined in how many of the seven areas (see Chapter 4.1.) an indicator occurred, i.e. which focus groups or experts had mentioned this characteristic. As a result, we have excluded two types of indicators or integrated them into other indicators:

1. Indicators that we consider too context-specific. This means that they are either only applicable in a specific field or for a particular target group (e.g. refugees) or that they can only be assessed by certain experts (e.g. specific mental disorders).
2. Characteristics that seemed to be so widespread that they are not meaningful in regard to processes of radicalisation. We assessed this based on the statements in the focus groups and expert interviews. For example, the participants quite frequently discussed external characteristics that are considered expressions of conservative Islam. At the same time, however, several participants mentioned that such characteristics rarely indicate radicalisation or that abandoning them is not (necessarily) the aim of a de-radicalisation.

Consistency with the literature

In the second step, we examined to what extent our indicators matched those in existing instruments and scales for the assessment of radicalisation (e.g. VERA-2R as well as scales from scientific studies). We carried out a systematic literature search for such instruments and studies. We then structured the results on the indicator level, clustering similar indicators into the same group. This abbreviated list of indicators was then used for comparison with our own indicators. It turned out that the majority of the criteria we developed – with different emphases – are also present in the international literature. However, a few indicators from our catalogue were not found in the literature. A discussion within the team led to the conclusion that these were very specific manifestations that could be integrated into broader constructs already existing in our catalogue of indicators.


Assessability and accuracy of definitions

As part of an evaluation, it may become necessary that different people perform an assessment with the EvIs indicators. Therefore, it is important that different evaluators agree as much as possible in their assessment. This means, for example, that all individuals whom different evaluators rate as “very strong” on the indicator “lack of self-confidence” actually show comparable signs of this characteristic. In other words, the aim is to maximise agreement in the subjective assessment of the evaluators by defining the indicators as precisely and unambiguously as possible. The technical term for this is inter-rater reliability. It serves to increase the quality of the data.

Different evaluators should come to similar assessments.

In order to assess to what extent the ratings of different evaluators for an indicator match, we conducted a reliability test. This was done based on anonymised summaries of the criminal files of 15 persons imprisoned in Germany. In all cases, the authorities had identified signs of Islamist radicalisation. The test was meant to determine whether the file material

Figure 3:
Selection of the indicators



contained sufficient information for a rating of our indicators and whether two evaluators independently arrive at the same result. Hence, two people rated each of the indicators (at this stage 62), deciding whether the respective characteristic was either “not present” or “present” in the prisoner or whether the indicator was “not applicable” or the file contained “insufficient information”. Using the Cohens-Kappa coefficient for inter-rater reliability, we statistically calculated the degree of agreement between the ratings for each indicator.

Afterwards, we discussed the statistical results within the team, taking a closer look at indicators with a low degree of agreement. If the lack of agreement was due to insufficient information in the files, we did not exclude the indicator for the time being. However, if the deviation was due to a definition that was too complex, abstract or misleading and refining it still did not seem expedient, we decided to exclude the indicator from the list. For example, we found that the indicator “other fundamentalist attitudes” was too general to be attributed consistently to individuals.

Practical relevance

In a final step, we discussed the catalogue we had developed up to that point with practitioners of secondary-selective and tertiary-indicated prevention. The aim was to include their assessment of the relevance and applicability of the indicators for their work and to obtain feedback on the comprehensibility. Based on this feedback, we adjusted some of the definitions and indicator titles, merged indicators that were seen as (almost) synonymous, and excluded indicators that were not considered relevant to practical work by multiple practitioners.

Static risk factors

Based on the practitioners' feedback and our own considerations, we dissolved the category of static risk factors. On the one hand, many of these characteristics were merely descriptive (e.g. conversion to Islam). On the other hand, this category included critical life events from the past (e.g. sexual abuse) which cannot be influenced by a preventive intervention per se but often represent important aspects of the individual's development. We have reformulated the latter indicators in such a way that the focus is on coping mechanisms for dealing with such critical life events (see the category "Coping with critical life events").

Protective and context factors

We have decided not to include protective and societal context factors as additional indicators in the tool. The reasons for this decision and further details are set out in the following chapters.

So far, the precise way in which protective factors work has been sparsely researched.

5. Protective factors

Radicalisation processes emerge from an interaction of favourable and unfavourable influences. In research and prevention practice, these are understood as risk factors and protective factors. Experts are increasingly recommending that greater attention be paid to protective factors (Sieckelinck/Gielen 2018; Steffen 2015; Eilers et al. 2015). In practice, some approaches already actively promote protective factors (see the KISSeS approach: Möller et al. 2016; Schroer-Hippel 2018).

However, research on the exact function of protective factors remains limited (see Ullrich/Coid 2011). On the one hand, they can form a kind of safeguard against radical influences and a counterweight to certain risk factors. Thus, they reduce the risk of an individual becoming radicalised from the outset, in the sense of a primary-preventive effect. On the other hand, protective factors can support the process of turning away from existing radical tendencies and can have a stabilising effect on a person's de-radicalisation and/or (re-)integration.

Due to the inconclusive research situation on protective factors, we have not included them as evaluation criteria in EvIs. Another reason for this was that protective factors accounted for a relatively small part of the discussion in our focus groups and expert interviews. Therefore, in the end, we identified only a small number of possible protective factors compared to those discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Lösel et al. 2018). In addition, the selection process described above revealed that many of the protective factors mentioned were merely the opposite of a risk factor. This would have led to unnecessary redundancies, which is why we excluded these protective factors.

The remaining protective factors mentioned in the focus groups and expert interviews can roughly be divided into the three areas of "education", "social integration" and "personal relationships".

5.1 Education

Education, here, is understood in a broader sense as the active formation of values, knowledge and skills.¹²

Critical thinking

This describes the ability to form one's own opinion, to scrutinise information and the positions of others critically and to deal with contradictory opinions constructively. The promotion of critical thinking is often a central component of the work in all areas of prevention (see also Mücke 2016; bpb 2018). By showing alternative patterns of interpretation, opinions and perspectives, prevention tries to enable young people to make their own informed decisions instead of blindly adopting radical positions.

The goal [is] for the young people to develop a critical awareness so that they don't just accept things [...]. "I've heard something from a Salafi preacher, so I'm just going to accept it without questioning it." ...that you also simply encourage the young person to simply question things. (FG Prevention)

Civic education/democratic education

Democratic education programmes intend to familiarise young people with the liberal-democratic system of our society and

12 | We refer – roughly speaking – to the concept of "Bildung" originating from humanistic thinking in Germany in the 18th century and based, principally, on the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt (see Böhm/Seichter 2018: 74-75); for a comprehensive article in English on the philosophical content of the German notion of Bildung see Cassin et al. (2014: 111-119)

to point out the tangible advantages it means for the individual person in their everyday life. Ideally, this should also include conveying legitimate means of political influence and protest that are available for young people to assert their interests. This intends to promote the experience of self-efficacy in relation to socio-political issues.

To put it plainly, it's about making democracy attractive. So, what kind of advantages does it have for you, not as an abstract theory, but very concretely in everyday life, what kind of advantages does it bring for you? Are you aware that in other countries they would put you in jail for what you just did and the way you live here, are you aware of that? And that, through this, they [young people] develop a fundamental rejection of authoritarian narratives. (FG Prevention)

Programmes of civic education, if classified as prevention, fall into the area of primary-universal prevention.¹³ In the focus groups, some participants also called for improved integration of democratic education into regular school curricula. Nevertheless, secondary-selective prevention employs methods of civic education as well (see VPN n. d.). Programmes of tertiary-indicated prevention also address understandings of democracy.¹⁴

Sound theological education

A thorough theological education is considered to decrease susceptibility to radical, simplified religious positions. What exactly such a well-founded education does or does not contain, remained unclear in the focus groups and expert interviews. Some preventive interventions also impart religious knowledge if this seems sensible for the target group.

13 | For the debate on the limits of the concept of prevention, see footnote 4.
14 | See, e.g., <https://www.im.nrw/api>; https://www.kipni.niedersachsen.de/startseite/praevention_und_ausstiegsarbeit/ausstiegsarbeit/aktion_neustart/aktion-neustart---aussteigerprogramm-islamismus-157884.html

5.2 Social integration

The area of social integration encompasses various elements and domains of social life.

Personal ties to mainstream society/integration

Personal ties to non-Muslims in the mainstream society should increase tolerance for other ways of life and views as well as strengthen identification with society. Primary-universal prevention projects often aim to establish opportunities for such interreligious or intercultural contact..

Alternative meaningful leisure activities

This refers to any leisure activities that offer young people alternative possibilities of social participation and generating meaning. They can reduce the attractiveness of radical groups, which also promise to fulfil these needs. Involving radicalised or vulnerable people in alternative leisure activities beyond radical groups is often part of a de-radicalisation process as a means of social (re-)integration.

Empowerment/community engagement

This describes integration into networks that give young people the opportunity to get involved in areas that interest them. This should also support and encourage young people in shaping their own future. This corresponds to the demand for more civic education and democratic education and mainly concerns social work services in Muslim communities.

The moment young people can get involved [...] can set their agenda, determine relevant topics and generate solutions – when they can perceive themselves as part of society through involvement and participation – at that point, we have the better alternatives, which help to prevent radicalisation. (FG Prevention)

5.3 Personal relationships

The importance of intact personal relationships for positive social development is undisputed (Cierpka/Seiffge-Krenke 2009; Sommerfeld 2007; Reichle/Gloger-Tippelt 2007; Brisch/Hellbrügge 2009). Two components are considered particularly relevant in the context of radicalisation:

Confidant/alternative role models

This refers to individuals outside the Islamist scene with whom the (potentially) radicalised person already has or can establish a trusting relationship. This could be, for example, a social worker or a religious figure, but he or she may also belong to the immediate social environment of the person concerned (e.g. relatives). In counselling, the counsellor often adopts this role initially, usually with the aim of finding alternative confidants and role models.

Care/responsibility for others

It can be an incentive to disengage from radical structures if the person concerned feels responsible for other people or if there is a possibility for them to take responsibility, for example, for children or relatives in need of care. Using such “resources” accordingly can be part of disengagement and de-radicalisation work.

I had a good feeling that he was going to disengage from it. If he is somewhat put in a position to take care of himself and his family and can also create something, develop something, then he is no longer susceptible to it. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

6. Contextual factors

Islamist radicalisation develops from the interplay of individual characteristics of a person with their social environment. It takes place against the background of developments and structures in society as a whole. The economy, the media, norms, laws and the overall societal climate affect the socialisation of individual (young) people in different ways and intensities. Individual preventive interventions cannot change influences at this societal macro level. They need to be addressed at the political level. Because this tool serves to evaluate individual interventions, however, so-called contextual factors are not included in EvIs.

This does not mean that societal framework conditions are of no importance for prevention. On the contrary, the experts in the focus groups referred to them regularly. Therefore, we consider it important to name and describe them here.

Individual radicalisation processes emerge from the prevailing political and normative order. Individuals experience this order in their everyday life through other people's expectations at work, within the family, at school or in vocational training, and through established role models and gender roles.

Each individual experiences these societal influences differently. Perceived or actual social grievances can be particularly relevant for processes of turning towards Islamist extremism. Experience of discrimination, social disadvantage and other negative experiences in connection with one's religious identity can lead young people to rebel against these grievances in a radical way.

Even if external societal conditions are not easily changed, prevention can help young people to cope with them. For example,

The interaction between individual characteristics and societal context factors determines the development of radicalisation.

it can support them in finding legitimate forms of protest. This can prevent young people from permanently turning away from society and drifting into radical milieus. The participants in the focus groups mentioned several structural features, which we have summarised below under two headings: "organisational structures of Muslim communities in Germany" and "discrimination and exclusion within mainstream society".

6.1 Organisational structures of Muslim communities in Germany

Contextual factors in this category are related to the religious identity of young people. These young people identify as Muslim and want to live and understand their religion appropriately. In this context, certain structural conditions may be detrimental to their development. The following two contextual factors should be mentioned here:

Dissonance between democratic values and positions propagated in some mosques

This describes the fact that some of the positions propagated in certain mosques are in contradiction to the German liberal-democratic constitutional order and that this contradiction is not addressed. For example, some preachers propagate the relevance and priority of Sharia as a normative authority for various everyday issues. However, the same preachers often state that Muslims should adhere to German law and be open for dialogue with non-Muslims.

Deficits in resources and services of mosque communities

This refers, for example, to the lack of financial resources for the employment and qualification of imams. Furthermore, this factor includes inadequate language skills among imams, e.g. to deliver the sermon in German or to communicate with community members in German. These structural and personnel

deficits are sometimes accompanied by inflated expectations from mainstream society. A frequent assumption or demand is that imams and mosques will "de-radicalise" vulnerable young people through their work. In addition, mosques often do not have enough to offer for young people. The topics dealt with in sermons are often not relevant or interesting to them. This means that these young people have no one to turn to and no reference points for their questions on religious topics, everyday concerns, identity, and so on.

The mosque communities and above all the Islamic associations, I would say they do important work and that the probability of radicalisation is smaller for those young people who are integrated into mainstream mosque communities. But what the Islamic associations fail to do is to generate alternative offers for the many young people without religious education, who are in search of answers, identity, community, a sense of togetherness and so on. So, this vacuum: German-speaking, tailored to a specific target-group, resource-oriented, suitable for young people. (FG Prevention)

6.2 Discrimination and exclusion within mainstream society

In this category, we have summarised contextual factors which, in the form of exclusionary social systems, can have a negative influence on the socialisation of young Muslims.¹⁵ These various forms of exclusion, which are described in the following paragraphs, can substantially foster processes of turning towards Islamist extremism. The drift towards radical positions or groups then takes place as a reaction to injustices experienced individually or collectively (as a Muslim).

¹⁵ | The factors and definitions listed here have been presented first in an article by Moussa Nabo and Nehlsen (2019).

Negative, generalising discourse on Islam

This includes, among other things, the general perception of people with an Arab, Turkish or similar immigration background as (primarily) Muslims. This is particularly evident when negative incidents, such as crimes, involving people from these groups are reduced to the attribute "Muslim", and the reason for the deviant behaviour is seen in the (alleged) religious affiliation. Furthermore, this factor refers to predominantly or exclusively negative media coverage on Muslims. This includes the fact that the phenomenon of Islamism is overrepresented in the media, especially in comparison to the visibility of the Muslim population in the media otherwise.

At the same time, however, the everyday, subjective view of Muslims here in Germany is also important. Like when I'm in my car in the morning, turning on the radio. That's when it starts: Islamism there, Islamism here. [...] Then you go and meet two German friends and they say "Dude, what's going on with you guys over there? God, here and there, everywhere [Islamist terrorism]...". Phew, okay, then you come home, you turn on the TV, the "Maischberger" show or "Hart aber Fair" [German political talk shows]: Islamist this and that ... Everyone is talking about Islam, Islam, Islam. (FG Prevention)

Islamophobia/hostility towards Muslims

This refers to a general hostility towards Muslims and in particular Muslim migrants and discrimination against members of these groups.

Manifestations range from the exclusion of Muslims from certain social circles and institutions to discriminatory statements in personal interaction and anti-Muslim political propaganda, culminating in hate crimes against Muslims.

General suspicion

This describes the tendency to associate Muslims directly and categorically with terrorist attacks – for example, when people are perceived as potential terrorists based on external characteristics such as a long beard and a darker skin colour. In the aftermath of an Islamist terrorist attack, Muslim citizens are often expected to explain, justify and distance themselves from the cause.

Double standards within mainstream society

This describes the tendency of mainstream society to acknowledge or commemorate victims of terrorist violence primarily or even exclusively when they are European or Western victims. The attacks in the Arab/Muslim world do not receive the same media coverage or are ignored entirely.

Many young people said, "Listen, the day before Paris, 40 people died in attacks in Lebanon. Nobody cared. The day after Paris, 100 people died in Iraq. Nobody cared either. Why should we have a minute of silence right now, just for the victims of Paris?" (FG Prevention)

Paternalism of mainstream society

This refers to non-Muslim institutions and actors prescribing what Islam is or should be and how exactly Islam and extremism are allegedly connected.

Lack of cultural sensitivity in mainstream society

This refers to individuals, institutions and authorities who are in regular contact with the Muslim population, but at the same time show a lack of cultural sensitivity. This concerns, in particular, schools and educators as well as the police and administrative offices.

Lack of Islamic education in schools

This refers to the lack of "religious education" as a subject for Muslim students in German schools. A lack of Islamic education in schools contributes to many young people receiving little substantiated knowledge about Islam. They are, therefore, more susceptible to distorted, simplified positions and interpretations by Islamist actors.

Exclusionary social/political structures

This describes a lack of opportunities for migrants to participate in political and social life in Germany. This may have formal or structural reasons, such as exclusion from the right to vote or refusal of dual citizenship. However, this also includes social discourses that disallow people with a migrant background to identify as German and/or demand they completely detach themselves from their foreign roots.

PART II:
EvIs – THE TOOL

1. Structure and application of EvIs

The criteria presented in this tool help to assess characteristics of participants in a preventive intervention and document changes in these characteristics over the course of the intervention. This means that you can use EvIs to collect and document specific information for each participant. In a second step, you can aggregate these individual assessments in order to obtain information about the processes of change in a group of participants or about the effects of the preventive intervention as such.

1.1 Modular system

EvIs consists of 38 indicators of processes of turning towards Islamist extremism. The method used in developing these indicators is described in detail in Chapter 4 (Part I). In principle, the catalogue of indicators can be used across a variety of projects and interventions. However, you will notice that not all characteristics are equally important for each project or intervention. Therefore, we have designed EvIs as a modular system that allows evaluators (together with project staff) to select from a repertoire of standardised indicators those that best correspond to the objectives of the intervention. (For the appropriate use of the tool in an evaluation see also Part I, Chapters 2 and 3.)

Not all indicators are relevant for every intervention.

1.2 Structure

All indicators follow the same basic structure: at the top, you will find a title that describes the characteristic briefly and concisely. Some indicator titles resemble established constructs from psychology or the social sciences (e.g. dissociality). Although we considered these constructs when developing the indicators, they do not reflect their contents completely. Below the title, there is a short description of the indicator (the so-called operational definition). It serves as a basis for assessing whether and to what extent a characteristic is present in an individual. After the general description of the indicator, we provide concrete examples or additional information. For instance, in some cases, you will find precise instructions on what you should assess with this indicator (for example, in the category "Coping with critical life events", you need to assess the associated degree of stress and not the event itself). Furthermore, when necessary, we have provided specific examples for extreme manifestations or an absence of the indicator to serve as benchmarks for rating the degree of presence. Because some indicators have an overlap or interdependency with other indicators, you will sometimes find cross-references reminding you to clearly distinguish this indicator from another one or to pay special attention to another indicator as well. In addition to the operational definition, an original quotation from the focus groups or expert interviews is provided at the end as an illustrative example.

The 38 indicators are clustered under four headings: (1) Individual, (2) Coping with critical life events, (3) Social structures and (4) Religion and ideology. We chose this categorisation in order to simplify the data collection by combining thematically similar indicators.

1.3 Rating of the indicators

You rate an indicator by four different components (see Figure 4). Please use the "Assessment Protocol" which is a separate booklet to the manual. Copy the required number of booklets (one per person and time point) and, if necessary, use the electronic form (see 1.6 Analysis and interpretation).

Bottom-Up

Assess the indicators according to the "bottom-up" principle, meaning that for each individual characteristic, you rate whether and to what degree it is present in the individual, regardless of your overall consideration of how "radicalised" the person is. Furthermore, the presence of one indicator does not necessarily imply that another, possibly related, indicator must also be present. Although there are clear overlaps and dependencies between some indicators that you should take into account, you always have to rate an indicator on its own first.

What information do I have?

Use all available information to assess a person against the indicators. This includes personal interviews with the individual, relatives, counsellors and other people who know the individual. You should also use file material (e.g. meeting notes, medical records, prison records), when available, to rate the indicators. However, you should bear in mind that differences in the quality or quantity of sources could affect the comparability of the cases.

In the case of unclear, conflicting information from different sources or missing data, please tick the box "insufficient information". If an indicator is not applicable to the current situation of a person (e.g., "Non-compliance with therapeutic interventions" if there are no mental or substance use problems), tick the box "not applicable" (see Figure 4).

Make sure that the sources of information used for each case are comparable.

Rating


In order to assess how strongly an indicator is present, a 5-point scale is available. If, after thorough examination of all sources of information, there is no indication that the indicator is at least weakly present, rate it accordingly as "absent" (see Figure 4).

With the following four ratings, you can determine the degree of presence of an indicator from "mild" to "moderate", and "strong" to "very strong" (see Figure 4). A rating of "mild" means that a person shows only a few signs of the indicator, or that they display the corresponding behaviours or attitudes only at very rare occasions. Use the rating "very strong" only if the attitudes or behaviours cover a broad spectrum, are extreme (in terms of content) and/or are shown very frequently and over long periods.

Examples and further information

It is essential that you substantiate your ratings with concrete examples in the space provided on the "Assessment Protocol". This helps to make your assessment transparent. For each indicator, you also have the option of recording additional information that you consider relevant to reflect the manifestation of this indicator adequately. Examples and the additional information can be a valuable source of information for subsequent qualitative analysis (see below).

Figure 4:
Example for the assessment of an indicator



1.4 Rating of relevance

Not all indicators are equally relevant to the individual development of all participants in an intervention. Therefore, you should consider the relevance of each indicator for each person separately. If you are an external evaluator and your information is primarily based on records, you must rely on the assessment of project staff because it is unlikely that this rating can be made solely based on case files.

An indicator is irrelevant if, according to the assessment of project staff, it is not important for the (de-)radicalisation of the individual. If the indicator is clearly present but does not take priority in the intervention/counselling, it is of moderate relevance. You should rate an indicator as highly relevant when members of the team assume that change in this indi-

cator would lead to or indicate a significant positive development of the individual. In subsequent analyses, you should always consider the development of an indicator over time in conjunction with its individual relevance. Minor improvements of a highly relevant indicator can count as a similar success of an intervention as major improvements of indicators with less relevance.

1.5 Observation period

In order to detect changes, you must rate the selected indicators at least at two points in time. Always base your assessment on the "current state". This means that it is not important whether and to what extent the indicator was present at an earlier point in time.

When you assess a person at the beginning of an intervention, use all information available on the situation or behaviour of the individual immediately before the intervention. However, it is not always possible to collect all necessary information before the start of the intervention (e.g. because you or the counsellor first need to gain the trust of the client). You can, therefore, extend the data collection phase, for example, to the first weeks after the start of the intervention. However, the observation period (as opposed to the data collection period) must be identical for all indicators. Always assess behaviours and situations relating to the time immediately before the start of the intervention.

The observation period must be identical for all indicators.

Ideally, your first assessment and rating should take place before the start of the intervention and is referred to as measurement time 0 (T₀). You can then define time intervals after the start of the intervention (T₁, T₂, T₃, etc.) for further assessments. These intervals depend on the aim of the evaluation or monitoring. If you want to determine differences between measurement times for a group of individuals (e.g.

to compare them with a group that did not participate in the intervention), the time intervals between T₀ and T₁, between T₁ and T₂, and so on should be the same. In order to assess the effects of the intervention, you must rate the indicators again at the end of the intervention. You can carry out further assessments some time after the intervention has been completed in order to examine the stability of the effects.

Avoid the following errors when rating the indicators:

Make sure to consider a sufficient range of attitudes and behaviours when rating the indicators. It does not suffice to merely compare the information you have collected with the specific examples given in the operational definitions or the quotes from the expert interviews/focus groups. Instead, you should examine all available information as to whether it fits the operational definition of the indicator.



Quite often, evaluators develop certain tendencies in their judgement. These include, for example, particular severity or mildness, or a tendency towards the middle or extremes of the rating scale. There is also the danger that you may be influenced by your overall impression of the person (halo effect) instead of rating each indicator individually. You should be aware of such biases and scrutinise your ratings to make sure you are not affected by such a tendency.¹⁶

¹⁶ | For further information, see Amelang/Zielinski (1997).

1.6 Analysis and interpretation

In general, you can use the results obtained with EvIs for both the individual case and the total sample of participants in the intervention. The results can be analysed for evaluation purposes by a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The possibilities of analysing and interpreting the data and results are manifold. Below are just a few examples:

In order to quantify the differences between individual measurement times, you can assign numerical values to the ratings of the indicators (0 for "absent" to 4 for "very strong"). You can then enter these values into a digital form, which allows the calculation of differences and, if necessary, further analyses. The form is available on the website of the National Centre for Crime Prevention (www.nzkrim.de).

In addition, you can perform further analyses with suitable software such as SPSS, MAXQDA or Office applications. For example, you have the option of linking the relevance of an indicator with your rating using an appropriate algorithm in order to obtain a more differentiated profile (e.g. by weighting or excluding individual indicators).

You can estimate the effects of an intervention as a whole by calculating changes for each individual case and then aggregating them over several individual cases using appropriate statistical methods.

The examples and further information you have recorded for the indicators offer the possibility of comprehensive qualitative content analyses, both in individual cases and across sub-samples.

INDICATORS

INDIVIDUAL

- ▶ Lack of self-confidence
- ▶ Ambiguity intolerance
- ▶ Dissociality
- ▶ Propensity for violence
- ▶ Identity crisis
- ▶ Acute life crisis
- ▶ Evidence of potential deliberate self-harm
- ▶ Problematic use of substances
- ▶ Psychological problems
- ▶ Non-compliance with therapeutic interventions

COPING WITH CRITICAL LIFE EVENTS

- ▶ Stressful separation experience
- ▶ Death of a loved one
- ▶ Sexual assault

SOCIAL STRUCTURES

- ▶ Difficult social conditions
- ▶ Difficult family circumstances/relationships
- ▶ Unfulfilled need for appreciation/recognition
- ▶ Social withdrawal/isolation
- ▶ Patriarchal notion of gender roles
- ▶ Reinterpretation of discrimination experience:
Active self-victimisation

RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY

- ▶ Missionizing/reprimanding the social environment
- ▶ Contacts to a radicalised social environment
- ▶ Uncompromising regarding prayer rituals
- ▶ Current problems seen as an ordeal imposed by God
- ▶ Juvenile provocation through religious/Islamist behaviour
- ▶ Rejection/degradation of non-Muslims
- ▶ Degradation of other Muslims
- ▶ Anti-Semitic remarks
- ▶ Sense of religious superiority
- ▶ Rejection of Western values
- ▶ Construction of an enemy-other
- ▶ Politicisation
- ▶ Moral outrage due to violence in the Muslim world
- ▶ Pertinent statements/phrases
- ▶ Consumption and/or dissemination of pertinent content
- ▶ Use of pertinent ideological symbols
- ▶ Idealisation of martyrdom
- ▶ Religious justification of crime
- ▶ Endorsement of religiously motivated violence



Lack of self-confidence

This indicator describes a feeling of being overwhelmed by the need for decision-making and with the multitude of possibilities for action in various areas of life.

Individuals may not see that the potential to make decisions lies within themselves. Furthermore, they lack the ability to say "no" in certain situations and to deal with possible consequences. In contrast, self-confident individuals have an idea of what their own future should look like and possess the willingness to take the necessary steps to achieve their goals. A lack of self-confidence can also include a tendency for externalisation: Individuals may expect others to make decisions on their behalf or to have their decisions prescribed by clear rules. Further, insecure people are often particularly susceptible to the influence of others.

Example:

Some people have no role models, and the society around them is changing a lot. [...] And the children are not guided by anyone in this great freedom of choice. They're completely overwhelmed. "So, am I supposed to become this now, or am I supposed to do that? And if I want to become that, how does that even work? Or should I buy this or buy that? Or should I buy nothing at all? Or should I choose these friends or those friends?" (EI Prevention)



Ambiguity intolerance

This indicator describes the inability of a person to deal with ambiguity and contradictory actions of others.

Individuals tend to divide the world into clear-cut, binary categories (e.g. either/or, good/bad). They see complexity and diversity as obstacles in their attempts to understand something and therefore avoid dealing with them.

Examples:

The need is to simplify the world. To make the world clearly comprehensible. The world should become a village. Ideally, a village with no more than five houses, because then I can keep the overview, you see? And they cannot bear the complex societal structure, with all its contradictions and intertwinements. This tension cannot be endured and must be compensated for. (El Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

For young people, a clear opinion is easier; it's the more attractive option. Why should I deal with all the different opinions? They are more comfortable with a definitive interpretation [...] The world view is simplified, you get more and faster answers from these people [radicals]. (FG Imams)



Dissociality

This indicator describes antisocial behaviour that deviates from prevailing social norms.

Dissociality does not necessarily have to manifest itself in crimes but includes a variety of behaviours such as truancy, bullying, lack of empathy, impulsiveness, low frustration tolerance, and a low threshold for aggressive behaviour.

In extreme cases, individuals have been diagnosed with "conduct disorder" in childhood/adolescence or "dissocial personality disorder" in adulthood.

Examples:

[...] but primarily, of course, an element of dissocial personality disorder, quite simply. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

So that's basically one of the main catchwords: dissociality. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Propensity for violence

This indicator describes a general, not necessarily religiously/politically motivated propensity for violence. This inclination to use violence appears in various contexts and over a prolonged period.

A propensity for violence manifests itself in a low inhibition to the use of physical violence. It includes both the actual use of violence and the endorsement of violence as a legitimate means to achieve certain goals. The consumption of content that glorifies (non-fictional) violence can also indicate a propensity for violence.

A singular incident (even a serious one) is not sufficient to rate this indicator as present.

Examples:

So, this additional component that you mentioned, which then gives the final push. This means that the potential for violence is there, and then all you need is a catalyst that triggers the whole thing. (FG Refugee Shelters)

Or someone who perhaps already has a tendency towards violence, because of the classical factors known from empirical research, and who perhaps sees a possibility to live out his need for power. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Identity crisis

This indicator describes a fundamental search for one's identity. This is part of the natural process of self-discovery and self-development experienced by adolescents but may be perceived as a state of crisis and stress. Identity crises can also occur post-adolescence, for example due to profound life changes.

For people with a migrant background, this can involve a struggle between multiple cultural identities that may seem hard to reconcile. This crisis evolves in continuous confrontation with the social environment. For example, mainstream society may deny such individuals their identity as Germans, although they do not (exclusively) identify with their country of origin or that of their parents or grandparents.

Appropriate coping strategies can help in dealing with identity crises.

Rate the degree of stress. Describe the nature of the identity crisis in the Assessment Protocol.

Example:

My father is Jordanian. I would never ever say that Jordan is my home. I'd say Jordan is my father's country of origin. But I would never say that Jordan is my home country. Because in Jordan, I'm treated the same way as here. Many people say, "You're so German" or something. And so you get a bit into this cultural conflict somehow. You don't know where you belong anymore. [...] And it becomes easy for the radicals when, for example, people here say "No, you don't belong to Germany". Well, what's that supposed to mean? Like, why don't I belong to Germany, suddenly? Why should I belong to Jordan? [...] (FG Muslim Adolescents)



Acute life crisis

This indicator refers to the difficulty of dealing with a profoundly disruptive phase in the life of an individual, entailing the loss of perceived or actual certainty and stability.


An acute life crisis may relate, for example, to the recent loss of one's job or apprenticeship, imprisonment, unclear resident status or imminent deportation. The crucial aspect is that the individual experiences a considerable amount of stress and negative emotions such as grief, anger or anxiety due to these events. Through appropriate coping strategies, individuals can learn to deal with their situation and emotions.

Rate the degree of stress. Describe the nature of the life crisis in the Assessment Protocol.

This indicator differs from the indicator "Difficult social conditions", which objectively describes rather persistent conditions. Further, assess "Stressful separation experiences", "Death of a loved one", and "Sexual assault" under the respective separate indicators.

Example:

[...] People in these classic life crises, like conflicts within the family or with their girlfriend, they've been fired from their apprenticeship or have an exam coming up and suffer from test anxiety [...] and are now trying to find a way out, an exit strategy, by somehow planning, more or less amateurishly planning, terrorist attacks [...]. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Evidence of potential deliberate self-harm

This indicator describes signs of behaviour that may cause intentional damage to one's own physical integrity.

This includes but is not limited to the danger of suicide and, in particular, also of homicide-suicide (i.e. killing others in the act of one's suicide). It further includes self-harm such as "cutting".

Rate the degree based on the patient's statements and/or clinical observations. A suicide attempt would represent an extreme manifestation of this indicator.

Example:

In the end, they'll be deported anyway. And then many say, "well, now it doesn't make sense." So drugs and suicide are part of everyday life in this area, I'd say. (FG Security Agencies)



Problematic use of substances

This indicator describes the problematic use (quantity and regularity) of substances such as alcohol, drugs or other psychotropic substances.

Problematic consumption occurs, for example, when individuals lose control over their consumption habits, show withdrawal symptoms, consume substances irresponsibly (e.g. driving while under the influence of substances) or continue consumption despite physical problems.

In case of socially accepted consumption or abstinence from any substances, rate this indicator as "absent".

Examples:

If he starts taking drugs again, he'll end up at the train station. There he'll just meet the wrong people. (FG Refugee Shelters)

[...] and also has a medication addiction and a few other things. (EI Prevention)



Psychological problems

This indicator refers to observed psychological problems that, however, do not necessarily reach the threshold of a mental disorder (subclinical).

These can be, for example, narcissistic traits, emotional instability or a depressed mood.

Rate the severity of the "problem" based on the level of suffering and the impact on the individual's quality of life. If a mental disorder has been professionally diagnosed, consider the diagnosis when assessing the severity.

Examples:

There are a few photos of him when the Islamic State is proclaimed and many Islamist fighters are parading through Rakka. And he is standing on a pickup truck with the flag, and there you can clearly see references to narcissistic personality traits. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

But if I have someone who is, let's say, already has a bit of an unstable personality, it is, of course, easier to reach him through this new life situation 'prison'. (FG Prisons)



Non-compliance with therapeutic interventions

This indicator refers to the rejection of medical or psychotherapeutic measures, social therapy, and other interventions designed to treat the psychological problems/symptoms of the individual.

Interventions can take place in outpatient, inpatient and supervised settings (e.g. prison). Non-therapeutic measures such as debt counselling are not included here.

The degree of the non-compliance depends on whether the individual rejects any intervention despite specific advice, or whether they participate to some degree.

Rate this indicator as "not applicable" if there are currently no psychological problems and the indicators "Evidence of potential deliberate self-harm", "Problematic use of substances", and "Psychological problems" have been rated as "absent".

Example:

But our hands are tied when it comes to – when they don't want to take medication. And of course, this can be very difficult when they are in an acute phase and refuse to take the medication. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Stressful separation experience

This indicator concerns the way an individual deals with separation experiences that continue to trouble them. This is independent of how long ago the separation occurred. It may include, among other things, separation from a spouse/partner or other family members.

Rate the (current) degree of stress. Describe the nature of the separation experience under "examples" on the Assessment Protocol.

This indicator is to be distinguished from the indicator "Death of a loved one".

Examples:

His mother took off with his siblings, broke up with his father, went to Saudi Arabia. So he had hardly any contact with his father, who was extremely important to him, and no contact at all with his mother and siblings. (FG Security Agencies)

The risk is, of course, much higher where certain risk factors are present. Separation experiences and things like that. (FG Security Agencies)



Death of a loved one


This indicator refers to the way an individual copes with the death of an important attachment figure. It does not matter how long ago this experience occurred, only whether it continues to be a source of distress for the individual.

Rate the (current) degree of stress. If known, describe the circumstances of the death in the Assessment Protocol.

Examples:

Someone from the immediate family died, too. I think he's sort of without a family now. (FG Prisons)

A year before, she had discovered her uncle after his suicide. That was never processed; it was a traumatic experience for her. (FG Security Agencies)



Sexual assault

This indicator refers to the way an individual copes with the experience of sexual assault of any kind, including sexual abuse of a ward or a vulnerable person, sexual coercion and rape. This indicator can apply to all genders and the entire life span of the individual.

Rate the (current) severity of the resulting stress/traumatisation.

Example:

Yes, we also have a case where a young girl was raped. (El Prevention)




Difficult social conditions

This indicator describes precarious living conditions that tend to persist over longer periods, such as unemployment, financial problems, or living in a deprived area.

The indicator must be distinguished from the indicator “Acute life crisis” which describes a negative emotional reaction to acute life events.

Example:

The family, that is, he and his mother and sister, often came to the mosque to get something to eat. Well, they lived in poor conditions, too. Yes. Neglected, poor. (El Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Difficult family circumstances/ relationships

This indicator describes current conflicts between family members that distress the person in question. Depending on their age, this may refer either to the parents and siblings or to their own family (i.e. partner, children).

These conflicts manifest themselves, for example, in a lack of attention/care from parents, or the absence of a relationship or contact with the parents or the family. The indicator can also include psychological problems of the parents that affect the relationship or result in a lack of care. Of particular relevance here is the absence of a father figure (due to physical absence or lack of attention).

Consider this indicator also for young people who live in a youth residential home but still maintain contact with their original family.

In this context, also check the indicator "Unfulfilled need for appreciation/recognition".

Examples:

Then, during the analysis of his family environment, we saw what the real problem was. The parents set up a pizzeria. The pizzeria took all their energy and attention, and they had no time for their youngest son. And that was also the conflict that existed within the family. (FG Security Agencies)

A big problem is when the relationship with the child is broken, the father is violent, is gone, there is no wholesome father-child relationship. (FG Imams)



Unfulfilled need for appreciation/ recognition


This indicator describes a person's feeling that they do not get sufficient, continuous appreciation or recognition from their regular (non-extremist) social environment.

This can refer both to unconditional appreciation (e.g. by family and friends) and to the recognition of one's achievements and the experience of success (e.g. at school or work).

Examples:

Half a year ago, we had a case of a young girl. A girl who received basically no recognition or affirmation at all from her family or friends, and it was the same at school. (FG Prevention)

A loser, right, who gets picked at by everyone; in school, he is a complete failure, only bad grades, everyone makes fun of him, no father at home, the mother can't handle it, she yells at him. Yeah, we see that quite often. (FG Prevention)



Social withdrawal/isolation

This indicator refers to individuals actively withdrawing from their usual social environment.

This can run parallel to making contact with a new (radical) environment or may lead to a complete discontinuation of contact with the outside world. The resulting isolation is often accompanied by increased time spent online.

Examples:

The isolation from the family, the retreat, the social retreat, the intensive, frequent occupation with the internet and scriptures [...]. (El Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

[...] you totally isolate yourself. So, all of a sudden, you close yourself to everything. I know this from my own experience, too, suddenly you're not interested in anything anymore. (FG Muslim Adolescents)

Patriarchal notion of gender roles

This indicator describes the tendency (among both men and women) towards a stereotypical, clichéd understanding of gender roles, including misogynistic views. This comprises a patriarchal notion of gender relations in which the man is socially superior to the woman.

The concept of masculinity is characterised by power, strength, force, toughness, and militarism. In this view, the woman is considered weak, submissive, dependent, and of less worth; her main task is to care for the man and to produce offspring.

Examples:

The girls often have a wrong understanding. They make themselves weaker than in their parents' house. They are willing to be the second wife, to not go out anymore, to drop out of their studies and see it as their duty to be a wife; they think that this is what Allah commands. (FG Imams)

Yes, what we notice is that radicalised male adolescents rather become machos and show-offs. (FG Imams)





Reinterpretation of discrimination experience: Active self-victimisation

This indicator refers to a problematic way of dealing with experienced discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. Individuals may experience discrimination, both individually and collectively. They can employ various coping strategies to process the sense of injustice resulting from the discrimination, some of which, however, may foster radicalisation dynamics. In the coping strategy described in this indicator, the perception of victimhood dominates the self-image of the affected individuals. To restore self-esteem, the individual re-interprets the discrimination experience in a way that devalues the discriminator's group and constructs them as "the bad ones".

In this context, also consider the indicators "Rejection/degradation of non-Muslims", and "Construction of an enemy-other".

Examples:

Self-victimisation is the basis of violent extremists. Every violent extremist legitimises his attitude and his actions based on his perceived victimhood and understands them as a defence. And these victimhood narratives, of course, are celebrated in extremist networks. (FG Prevention)

And this discourse is in itself attractive because it ultimately explains the young person's own experiences of discrimination and disadvantage. He then finds: "Ah, I am being discriminated against. I am disadvantaged because I am a Muslim". And the perfidious thing is that this young person then perceives this victimhood as empowerment. So, through this discourse, the individual suddenly becomes part of a powerlessness of billions of Muslims. (FG Prevention)



Missionizing/reprimanding the social environment

This indicator describes active attempts to convince others of one's own religious or ideological views (including other Muslims).

This also includes attempts to reprimand or morally condemn the social environment (friends, family, classmates, fellow prisoners) for "un-Islamic" behaviour as well as proactively promoting adherence to "religiously appropriate" behaviours and rituals. Furthermore, missionary work in the sense of spreading Islamist ideologies and attempts to persuade others to leave Germany and join militant Islamist groups, also fall under this indicator.

Examples:

[...], who became increasingly radicalised and is still active on the internet today. I know this. Well, currently, I don't know, but she was still active online at the beginning of the year and tried to persuade women to come to Syria. (FG Security Agencies)

Especially when it changes. If everything was normal in the beginning and then later, in a letter to his girlfriend, he writes: "in the future, you will always have to wear a headscarf, you have to do this, you have to do that, the child must only learn Turkish, and you must only do this or that". So, you really find specific instructions on how to live. (FG Prisons)



Contacts to a radicalised social environment

This indicator describes the search for or existence of contacts to a Salafist/Islamist scene or with radicalised individuals, who may be under surveillance by the security services.

This includes being a member of a peer group with a pertinent orientation, being in a relationship with a radicalised person and visiting radically oriented mosques.

Examples:

Yes, I think the integration into group processes is also quite crucial, when, let's say we have a clique, a Salafist group, which also meets in private, in people's flats or something, but then also conducts private Islam seminars. (FG Prevention)

And if we notice, for example, that someone frequently interacts with people who are on the radar of the security services, that is also a warning sign. (FG Prevention)



Uncompromising regarding prayer rituals

This indicator refers to the strict, uncompromising adherence to prayer customs, such as time and frequency. Individuals practise their prayers rigorously, independent of place, circumstances and social conventions.

This behaviour illustrates the prioritisation of one's religious lifestyle over other everyday obligations and social behaviour norms established by mainstream society. Under certain circumstances, it can also include an explicitly provocative practising of religion to underline one's strict religiosity.

Examples:

Okay, so I can understand if you want to pray somewhere discreetly at the airport. But you come here, in ten, twenty minutes you are here, and you have four hours left for prayer, and you want to pray on the train. That's this provocative way. (El Imam)

[Pierre] Vogel is giving a speech outside; it's cold. And then, prayer time comes. And they start praying. Then you'd say, okay, there's a verse that says: [...] you can pray wherever you like. Of course, but there are at least ten mosques downtown. In the immediate vicinity. Ten mosques. So the first question is: Why do you pray outside? [...] And then why don't the women pray? [...] Or: they are waiting and listening outside in the cold for at least four, five hours. This ritual washing. No one there does it, they all came with Wudhu and stayed for four hours [...]. Why are you doing this? "Oh, but there's a verse saying that we can." They only pray to be seen. (El Imam)



Current problems seen as an ordeal imposed by God

This indicator describes a religious understanding based on which individuals view negative everyday experiences, strokes of fate, and problems (e.g. imprisonment) as part of divine providence. They hold the opinion that such situations serve to test believers' faith and religious fortitude.

Examples:

And these are the kind of typical statements of those who are already more strongly involved in such contexts or networks, who then say, "Hold on to your faith, this is all just to test us" and so on, you get all these typical phrases. (FG Prisons)

He was in custody, and he says "It's perfectly fine that I'm here. This is a trial that Allah has imposed on me, isn't it?" (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Juvenile provocation through religious/Islamist behaviour

This indicator describes provocative behaviour of a religious nature during adolescence (up to the age of 21), for example, as an expression of youth culture (rebellling against mainstream society, parents, conventions).

This can manifest itself in merely conservative-religious behaviour (e.g. wearing certain clothes), but also in actions with explicitly extremist references (e.g. watching ISIL propaganda videos). The aim of these actions is provocation: to attract attention, cause irritation, or distinguish oneself from others. The lack of ideological motivation may become apparent when different actions contradict each other.

Examples:

Also, in class. Sometimes it's simply outer appearance and then maybe certain remarks that maybe aren't even particularly well-founded or reflected. They maybe saw something online. They drop a few phrases in class and that already shocks everyone. (FG Prevention)

If he says: "I live here in Germany, and the constitution really is above the Sharia", then that's different from a young person saying "I don't care. I want to provoke, and I may also become violent." And if he says "Sharia is more important than the constitution." (FG Prevention)



Rejection/degradation of non-Muslims

This indicator describes a fundamental rejection of others because of their "religious otherness" (non-Muslims). The devaluation can also ostensibly refer to nationalities ("all Germans"); in this context, however, the assumption is that religious affiliation implicitly determines the "otherness".

In particular, the degradation is based on moral beliefs. In extreme cases, it can result in dehumanisation, thus justifying the killing of non-Muslims.


This rejection/degradation is expressed, inter alia, by avoiding non-Muslims as well as in derogatory statements, for example by calling non-Muslims "kuffar" (infidels).

The rejection of non-Muslims can also lead to the "Construction of an enemy-other", which is rated under the respective indicator.

Examples:

A Muslim is superior to a non-Muslim. (FG Prevention)

Young people come and say that you can't have Jews and Christians as friends. (FG Imams)



Degradation of other Muslims

This indicator describes the devaluation of Muslims adhering to a more tolerant interpretation and practice of Islam. They are accused of unbelief or apostasy and referred to as “kuffar”. In extreme cases, such moral devaluation can result in dehumanisation, thus justifying the killing of moderate Muslims or members of other branches of Islam (e.g. Shiites).

Examples:

Religion okay, but he actually goes one step too far. And that is often the point where those affected, friends or family turn to us and say: “We ourselves are Muslims, but that is going too far. His views are too radical, he calls all of us kuffar even though we are all believers”. (FG Security Agencies)

There is a spectrum, and it starts with the distinction between good Muslim and bad Muslim. The rationale is that you can fight against the bad Muslim. (FG Imams)




Anti-Semitic remarks

This indicator describes statements specifically targeted against the Jewish people. This includes anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism as well as conspiracy theories relating to “World Jewry”.

Examples:

Anti-Semitism is, I think, really a cross-group phenomenon. They even decorate themselves with others' symbols and everything. Even with swastikas and such. (FG Prisons)

He carved something into a wooden bench, like “Death to Israelis” or something like that. (EI Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Sense of religious superiority

This indicator describes the firm belief that one's own opinion (in relation to religion/politics) is the absolute, irrevocable truth.

Individuals either completely reject others' attempts to discuss such topics, or they cast-off any counterarguments or differing opinions as "misguided". Fundamental discussions with individuals showing this characteristic are, therefore, not possible.

Examples:

If there's a certain – "I know it all, and I don't care what anybody says" [attitude] [...]. (FG Refugee Shelters)

And when the Imam wants to engage him in a conversation, the prisoner, he blocks it off. Because he notices: "I don't have the knowledge, but I have my faith and that must be right. What the Imam is telling me cannot be true, because I heard it like this from the other one". (FG Prisons)



Rejection of Western values

This indicator describes a rejection of the Western value system, anchored in the liberal-democratic constitution. This includes, among other things, respect for fundamental rights (such as human dignity, human rights, the right to life and freedom, equality before the law, etc.), democracy and the rule of law.

Individuals may also express their rejection of these values through a general rejection of mainstream society.

Examples:

So, it implies a turning away from society, somehow. Rejection of society. They reject the core of society. Whether this leads to further actions or joining a group is a different question. But fundamentally, it is about a rejection of society. (FG Prevention)

We have many young people who say: "Democracy is idolatry, we only need the caliphate". (FG Prevention)



Construction of an enemy-other

This indicator describes a narrative that depicts certain (groups of) people as being responsible for certain problems and conflicts, which, in extreme cases, threaten the existence of the individual or their social group.

This characteristic manifests itself, among other things, in an "us vs. them" mentality, in which the "Other" is seen as an aggressor and the incarnation of evil. This depiction can lead to justifying (violent) measures against the perceived enemy, which may extend to promoting absolute physical annihilation. Some examples of concepts of the enemy-other in this context are:

- ▶ The West as the enemy: Here, Western military activities in Muslim majority countries, discrimination against Muslims in the West or the moral reprehensibility of Western values may be utilised as a justification of violence.
- ▶ Unbelievers as enemies: Here, unbelievers (non-Muslims) in general are portrayed as enemies of Islam and Muslims.

Example:

You can basically see this with all extremist developments, that the way of thinking moves in this demonising direction. So in the sense that [...] other groups are denied their humanity, that they are completely isolated, that they represent evil itself, so to speak; and that, on the other hand, is the idea of a pure, ideal, absolute [...] world, which can be achieved by exterminating these bearers of the badge of shame, the incarnation of evil. (El Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)



Politicisation

This indicator describes a development towards a political dimension of one's own religious views and identity. Individuals assess political events at home and abroad from a religious perspective. Religious questions, in turn, become inherently political.

Politicisation manifests itself, for example, in a religiously/politically motivated solidarity with brothers and sisters in faith, who suffer, for example, in the war zone of Syria, and experience great injustice. This solidarity can result in unproblematic activism (e.g. participating in a demonstration). However, as the process of politicisation progresses, religious explanatory models (oppression of Muslims, war of Muslims against the West) may come to dominate the individual's thinking so much that they increasingly adopt and internalise radical Islamist positions.

Examples:

And maybe also people who have higher goals, who might think "we have to fight against Assad". And I mean, from their view, it's even a good deed, so, saying "I'm going to Syria, and I fight against Assad, I fight against a dictator". (FG Prevention)

And then, of course, there are the ideological ones, especially now from the Salafists and ISIL, from Daesh. They are addressing this very sense of injustice, saying: "and you, brother, do you want to watch while our brothers and sisters are being slaughtered or do you want to get up and fight like a man" and so on. (FG Prevention)



Moral outrage due to violence in the Muslim world

This indicator describes a reaction of Muslims in Germany to the suffering and injustice caused by wars in Muslim majority countries, for which they perceive Western powers to be (partly) responsible.

This does not necessarily imply the development of problematic patterns of thought.

However, if this indicator is present, also consider the following related indicators: "Reinterpretation of discrimination experience: Active self-victimisation", "Construction of an enemy-other", and "Politicisation".

Examples:

[...] they didn't go there because they wanted to murder and because they thought it was fun, but because they have seen the images on TV. Because they were told: "How can you stay here as a Muslim in this country while in Syria, your sisters in faith are raped, children die and what not?" (FG Prevention)

Yes, Abu Ghraib and also Fallujah, that rape story there, ten years ago, I think, where those US soldiers raped an entire village, women and also men. Or Bosnia, or anything you can take as an example. The problem is, you have to take a differentiated approach. [...] That's almost impossible. (El Imam)



Pertinent statements/phrases

This indicator refers to verbal expressions often used by radicalised individuals.

These can have different manifestations in terms of form and content:

- ▶ Religious terms of differentiation, such as "infidels" (kafir [singular], kuffar [plural])
- ▶ Professions of sympathy for jihadist groups and positive statements concerning Islamist attacks
- ▶ Calls for perseverance with religious reference to strengthen endurance in difficult life situations
- ▶ Expressions of explicit, pertinent religious positions, referencing relevant people or sources (certain religious scholars, Imams, theorists or preachers, etc.)
- ▶ Quoting verses and surahs of the Koran in order to substantiate extreme views of any kind

Examples:

This can also be an indicator, [...] if they receive these letters from the outside with general recitations from the Koran or something, they are kept general, but still: "stand firm" or also "the system is against you", "the judiciary is against you", "stand firm, you can do it, God is with you", things like that. (FG Prisons)

Also very typical is a certain affected behaviour, for example, in class: "You are all kuffar, you will all burn in hell". (FG Security Agencies)



Consumption and/or dissemination of pertinent content

This indicator describes the consumption and/or dissemination of different types of content with Islamist reference.

This includes, for example, watching and possibly sharing videos (propaganda, sermons, webinars, and pertinent violent videos), listening to problematic anasheed (religious chants), reading/ordering pertinent literature as well as visiting certain online portals and writing pertinent comments in social networks.

Examples:

Or also ordering certain literature. We made this experience a lot that inmates suddenly no longer wanted general mainstream literature, but only literature by certain authors or publishers or something like that. This, too, can give us hints that there is at least an indication. (FG Prisons)

It starts with the student who sends his WhatsApp video to the other student in the schoolyard, that contains propaganda from ISIL, for example. (FG Security Agencies)



Use of pertinent ideological symbols

This indicator describes the use of religious-ideological symbols to decorate one's personal space (own room/cell) and/or for self-expression (e.g. on social media profiles, tattoos, etc.).

This indicator refers to symbols that are associated with the Islamist spectrum, such as the ISIL flag or the Tawhid finger.

Examples:

So if they find some sort of documents during cell search and it says something like "the Islamic State is great", or something. (El Psychiatric/Psychological Experts)

Or he has a Facebook profile that [reveals] relevant information through certain symbolisms, certain posts, [...] etc., so that this initial suspicion can then be substantiated. (FG Security Agencies)



Idealisation of martyrdom

This indicator describes the endorsement or even glorification of martyrdom. Individuals regard dying for Allah and Islam as a desirable goal in order to gain immediate access to paradise.

This can manifest itself in the glorification of other martyrs (e.g. ISIL fighters) or in an explicit expression of the individual's intention to die as a martyr.

Examples:

This happens quite often that we get people that are already known from the media as fighters from Syria or somewhere else. They are then seen as heroes, rather than the bad guys, by some people who think this is really great. (FG Prisons)

Another case: the teenager, the nineteen-year-old, who is at a vocational school and communicates in his WhatsApp chat that his goal is martyrdom. (FG Security Agencies)



Religious justification of crime

This indicator describes the justification of criminal acts, such as shoplifting, on the grounds of a perceived state of war between Muslims and Germany, the West, or the infidels. The rationale for this can be jihad as such and/or the participation of Western countries in conflicts in Muslim majority countries. Criminal acts are thus justified in the context of "spoils of war".

In order to rate this indicator as present, the individual does not need to have engaged in such actions themselves; it is sufficient if they generally approve of them based on the above rationale.

Examples:

Well, I know someone who told me – I was 15 then, he was in his mid-30s – and he said, "yeah, it's okay to steal from the supermarket. Islam says nothing against it". And I'm like, "What is wrong with you? You have small children! How can you say that?" He says, "Yes, that's no problem at all. These people are attacking our countries and exploiting us. We can exploit them here." (FG Muslim Adolescents)

In [city in Germany] a fatwa was issued that stealing from shops is allowed because the goods are then considered spoils of war because the Western countries are at war [with Muslim majority countries]. (FG Imams)



Endorsement of religiously motivated violence

This indicator refers to different forms of endorsing or legitimating religiously-politically motivated violence. Violence is seen as a legitimate means in regards to religious as well as secular-political questions or circumstances.

This includes, but is not limited to, endorsing jihadist aspirations and actions.

Examples:

If my ideology is that the unbelievers are the devil and must be fought and killed. (FG Prisons)

So he comes to me and says, "Why though, I'm allowed to kill, you can kill people outside the religion, no problem". (FG Imams)

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How can we determine the effects of preventive interventions in the area of Islamist extremism? And how can we facilitate comparability between different interventions and evaluations? EvIs (Evaluation Criteria for the Prevention of Islamism) aims to bring us one step closer to answering these questions by providing a set of standardized criteria for evaluating interventions in the area of Preventing Violent Islamist Extremism. EvIs is a collection of 38 indicators that can be related to processes of turning towards Islamist extremism. They are based on the knowledge of practitioners from different areas of prevention in Germany and can, in principle, be modified by a preventive intervention. Designed as a modular system, EvIs can be tailored to different types of interventions and focuses on the individual development of each participant.

This manual contains the EvIs tool consisting of 38 indicators and gives specific instructions for its application. It also provides information on the development of EvIs and describes its role as a standardized tool in the context of tailor-made evaluations that are appropriate to their target.

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